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IS PRECLUSION UNDER Va. Code Ann. §19.2-264.3:1 UNCONSTITUTIONAL?
By: Elizabeth A. Bennett

A. Introduction
This article will discuss whether the provisions of Va. Code
Ann. §19.2-264.3:1 (Supp. 1989) requiring capital defendants either
to face possible preclusion of mental mitigation evidence or to
cooperate with a state psychiatrist, who can later testify against
defendant violate rights guaranteed by the federal constitution.
Preclusion may occur in one of two ways; first, failure by the defense
to provide timely notice and surrender all reports to the Commonwealth, and second, failure by the defendant to cooperate with the
Commonwealth's expert. Under V.C.A. §19.2-264.3:1, the defendant
is entitled to the assistance of a mental health expert in the preparation of a case in mitigation. To qualify the defendant need only show
that (1) he is indigent and (2) charged with capital murder'. Although initially protected by the attorney-client privilege, after the
attorney for the defendant gives notice-of an intent to present
psychiatric evidence in mitigation, the report and the results of any
other evaluation or copies of records3 shall be given to the Commonwealth. Failure to comply may result in preclusion of the defendant's
mental mitigation evidence. 4 This is the first of two ways in which
preclusion may occur. These disclosure and preclusion requirements
raise several potential Fifth and Sixth Amendment issues. First,
although the statute provides that "statements or disclosures shall be
admissible in rebuttal only when relevant to issues in mitigation
raised by the defense ' 1, no mechanism exists to safeguard against the
Commonwealth's use of disclosure statements to obtain additional
information to be used in its case in chief.
Second, V.C.A. §19.2-2643:1 requires that a defendant choose
between possible preclusion of evidence offered in mitigation, in
violation of the Sixth Amendment compulsory process clause, and
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments as held in Lockett v. Ohio,
438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L. Ed. 2d 973 (1978); Estelle v.
Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct 1866, 68 L. Ed. 2d 359 (1981);
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 102 S. Ct. 869, 71 L. Ed. 2d 1
(1982); Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 85 L. Ed. 2d
53 (1985); Skipper v. South Carolina,476 U.S. 1, 106 S. Ct. 1669, 90
L. Ed. 2d 1 (1986); and submission to the Commonwealth's expert
for examination and evaluation against his will and without the
benefit of counsel 6, in violation of his Fifth Amendment right against
self-incrimination.
Preclusion can also occur when the defendant fails to cooperate
with the Commonwealth's expert, once requested. A danger is also
presented by cooperation. Without counsel, defendant may make
involuntary self-incriminating statements in violation of Fifth7 and
Sixth" Amendment rights as discussed in Estelle v. Smith. Putting
aside for the moment the important fact that heightened due process
standards are applicable in capital cases, the statute in any event
permits the Commonwealth to violate the rule established in Simmons
v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 88 S. Ct. 967, 19 L. Ed. 2d 1247
(1968), by compelling the defendant to surrender Sixth, Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights in order to assert his Fifth Amendment
right. For the reasons set forth below, counsel should carefully
balance the effect of preclusion of evidence versus the potential harm
of cooperation, and the waiver of rights constitutionally guaranteed.

B. Discussion of the jurisprudence relevant to the Issue of
mitigation evidence.
For more than a decade, the United States Supreme Court has
been consistent in its requirement that states erect no barriers to the
presentation and consideration of a virtually unlimited range of
mitigating evidence in capital trials. State procedures and evidentiary
rules have on occasion had to yield to the compelling importance of
this evidence
Recently, in Mills v. Maryland, 484 U.S. 975, 108 S.Ct. 1860,
100 L. Ed. 2d 384 (1988), the Supreme Court discussed the line of
cases involving the issue of presentation of mitigation evidence,
stating that:
"It is beyond dispute that in a capital case 'the sentencer [may]
not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any
aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the
circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a
basis for a sentence less than death."' Eddings v. Oklahoma,
455 U.S. 104, 110 (1982), quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S.
586 (1978) (plurality opinion) (emphasis in original). See
Skipper v. South Carolina,476 U.S. 1 (1986). The corollary
that "the sentencer may not refuse to consider or be precluded
from considering 'any relevant mitigating evidence"' is
equally "well established" 108 S.Ct. 1860 at 1865. The Court
noted that it is not relevant whether the barrier to the sentencer's consideration of all mitigating evidence is interposed
by statute, Lockett v. Ohio, supra;Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481
U.S. 393, 107 S.Ct. 1821, 95 L. Ed. 2d347 (1987); by the
sentencing court, Eddings v. Oklahoma, supra;or by an
evidentiary ruling, Skipper v. South Carolina,supra.
Therefore, V.C.A. §19.2-264.3:1 which requires that the defendant
submit to examination by the Commonwealth's expert or face
possible preclusion of evidence proffered in mitigation violates: (1)
rights required by the Lockett line of cases discussed supra, and (2)
Simmons, supra,by compelling defendant choose between two
constitutionally protected rights, discussed infra in section D.

C. The application of V.C.A. §19.2-264.3:1.
This section provides for the appointment of one or more mental
health experts "to evaluate the defendant and to assist the defense in
its preparation and presentation of information concerning the
defendant's history, character, or mental condition..." The report
shall be sent solely to the attorney for the defendant and is protected
by the attorney-client privilege; except, when the defendant gives
notice of an intent to present psychiatric or psychological evidence in
mitigation pursuant to subsection (E).1° Several questions arise when
the defendant is forced to undergo psychiatric evaluation which may
provide statements or disclosures admissible in rebuttal when
relevant to issues in mitigation raised by the defense, or face
preclusion of his mitigation evidence.
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First, if defendant gives notice of an intent to present psychiatric or psychological evidence in mitigation pursuant to subsection
(E), the Commonwealth shall be given not only the report (submitted
pursuant to subsection C), but "the results of any other evaluation of
defendant's mental condition conducted relative to the sentencing
proceeding.. ."I IThis notice allows the Commonwealth to seek
an evaluation concerning the existence or absence of mitigating
circumstances relating to the defendant's mental condition at the time
of the offense.. ." Second, the court shall order the defendant to
submit to the evaluation and refusal to cooperate could result in
exclusion of the defendant's expert evidence. It is this threat of
exclusion which forces the defendant to submit to evaluation, with
knowledge that statements or disclosures made to the Commonwealth's expert shall be admissible in rebuttal when relevant to issues
in mitigation raised by the defense. If the court excludes the
defendant's expert evidence, the defendant may be prevented from
offering mitigation evidence in violation of constitutional rights
guaranteed by the Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Another potential Fifth Amendment problem arises because no
procedures exist to ensure against the Commonwealth's use of
disclosure evidence contained in the report in their case in chief.
Moreover, disclosure evidence not directly used may nevertheless
uncover additional evidence which could be used by the Commonwealth.

D.The balancing of the state's interest versus the defendant's
constitutional rights.
A balancing of interests occurs between the state's legitimate
interest as identified through its rules, procedures, and statutes, versus
the defendant's right to compulsory process and against selfincrimination. In Chambers v. Mississippi'1 , a non-capital case,
certiorari was granted to determine whether petitioner's trial was
conducted in accord with principles of due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment. In discussing the fundamental right of the
accused to present witnesses, the Court addressed the balancing of
interests which must occur "to assure both fairness and reliability in
the ascertainment of guilt and innocence." 13
The Court acknowledged that in order to assure both fairness
and reliability in exercising the right to present witnesses, the accused
must comply with established rules of procedure and evidence. 4
But, noting that the rejected testimony proffered by defendant "bore
persuasive assurances of trustworthiness and thus was well within the
basic rationale of the exception for declarations against interest," the
Court also found the testimony critical to Chambers' defense. The
Court concluded that the exclusion of critical evidence, and the
refusal to permit the cross-examination of the state's witness, denied
the defendant ". . . a trial in accord with traditional and fundamental
standards of due process." Similarly, defendant's evidence from an
expert appointed under V.C.A. §19.2-264.3:1(A) also bears persuasive assurances of trustworthiness, for s/he must qualify as an expert
pursuant to the requirements of subsection (A), and the Commonwealth is afforded the right to test the reliability of the testimony
through cross-examination.
In fact, that cross-examination may include elicitation of
statements made by defendant to the expert that are relevant to his/
her testimony and conclusions. The Commonwealth could even call
its own expert to testify based on the evidence revealed by the
defense expert's testimony. The only thing it cannot do is compel
defendant's uncounseled cooperation with its expert."5
Generally, there is no issue that defendant's evidence cannot be
said to be trustworthy unless it is rebutted. The Commonwealth
simply has no right to the assistance of defendant in the preparation

of its rebuttal. This is particularly true when that assistance must be
obtained in derogation of fundamental rights.
In another non-capital case, Rock v. Arkansas16, the trial judge
excluded the defendant's refreshed testimony (refreshed under
hypnosis) and ruled that defendant could only testify to matters
remembered or stated prior to hypnosis. In reversing her conviction,
Justice Blackmun's opinion for the Court recognized that "the right to
present relevant testimony is not without limitation," but cautioned
that "restrictions of a defendant's right to testify may notbe arbitrary
or disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve" 7
Moreover, he found Arkansas had established a rule that "operates to
the detriment of any defendant who undergoes hypnosis, without
regard to the reasons for it, the circumstances under which it took
place, or any independent verification of the information it produced."'8 In reaching this conclusion, the Court discussed previous
decisions, including Chambersv. Mississippi,supra,noting that
"[t]his Court reversed the judgment of conviction, holding that when
a state rule of evidence conflicts with the right to present witnesses,
the rule may 'not be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of 9
justice," but must meet the fundamental standards of due process."'
Virginia has enacted a statute which operates to the detriment of a
capital defendant by forcing him either to submit to examination
against his will, including interrogation by the Commonwealth's
expert, or face preclusion of evidence offered in mitigation. The
Commonwealth simply has no legitimate right to weigh in the
balance against defendant's compelling right to present witnesses in
the penalty phase of a capital trial.
In Brooks v. Tennessee2", a state rule required that a criminal
defendant "desiring to testify shall do so before any other testimony
for the defense is heard by the court trying the case."2 1 The Court
determined that the rule was ".... an impermissible restriction on the
defendant's right against self-incrimination, 'to remain silent unless
he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will, and to
22
suffer no penalty ...for such silence."
In discussing Fourth Amendment rights, the Supreme Court in
Simmons, held that it is intolerable that one constitutional right
should have to be surrendered in order to assert another. One issue
presented was whether defendant's constitutional rights were violated
when testimony given by him in support of his suppression motion
was admitted against him at trial 3 Petitioner contended that it was
reversible error to allow the Government to use against defendant the
testimony given by him upon his unsuccessful motion to suppress
evidence.24 Defendant could give testimony only by assuming the
risk that the testimony would later be admitted against him at trial.
The testimony linked defendant to ownership of a suitcase which a
few hours after the robbery was found to contain money wrappers
taken from the victimized bank. In considering the effect of this rule,
the Court noted that "[a] defendant is 'compelled' to testify in
support of a motion to suppress only in the sense that if he refrains
from testifying he will have to forego a benefit, and testimony is not
always involuntary as a matter of law simply because it is given to
obtain a benefit.2
"However, the assumption which underlies this reasoning is
that the defendant has a choice: he may refuse to testify and
I
this assumption
give up the benefit." The Court, in a plying
to a situation in which the 'benefit to be gained is that
afforded by another provision of the Bill of Rights, [found
that] an undeniable tension [was] crem ited."

".

390 U.S. at 394. The Court concluded that In this case defendant was
".... obligated either to give up what Pie believed, with advice
of counsel, to be a valid Fourth Amendment claim or, in legal
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effect, to waive his Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination. In these circumstances, we find it intolerable
that one constitutional right should have to be surrendered in
order to assert another."
Id. The Court held that when a defendant testifies in support of a
motion on Fourth Amendment grounds, his testimony may not be
admitted against him on the issue of guilt unless he makes no
objection. Similarly, V.C.A. §19.2-2643:1 places a capital defendant
in a position where s/he is faced with precisely the same conflict. S1
he should strenuously object to the statutory requirement that
compels her/him to waive her/his Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination or waive her/his right for the sentencer to consider
as a mitigating factor, evidence of her/his character or record and
circumstances of the offense proffered as a basis for a sentence less
than death.

dangerousness without first informing the defendant that he has a right
to remain silent and that anything he says can be used against him. 451
U.S. at 461-469.
sThe Court unanimously held that, once a capital defendant is
formally charged, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel precludes
examination without notification that "the psychiatric examination
(will) encompass the issue of their client's future dangerousness."Id. at
471.
9
Greenv. Georgia,442 U.S. 95, 99 S. Ct. 2150, 60 L. Ed. 2d 738
(1979).
' 0 V.C.A. §19.2-264.3:1(D).
111d.
12410 U.S. 284, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1973).
13410 U.S. at 302.
14Id.
5

E. Conclusion.
V.C.A. §19.2-264.3:1 violates a capital defendant's constitutional rights under Simmons, supra. This statute compels a capital
defendant to waive his Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination by submitting to examination by an expert appointed
for the Commonwealth, furnish the experts with statements made by
the defendant to his expert, or be precluded from proffering evidence
in mitigation as guaranteed by the Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments. Furthermore, it is settled that in almost all circumstances the sentencer may not be precluded from considering any
relevant information proffered in mitigation. It is as yet not decided
whether V.C.A. §19.2-264.3:1, by precluding evidence offered in
mitigation (for failure to waive a constitutional right against selfincrimination), violates the line of cases cited most recently in Mills,
supra.
Accordingly, once the defendant has given notice of intent to
use mental mitigation evidence, s/he should advise the Commonwealth that the portion of §19.2-264.3:1 discussed herein requiring
defendant to make uncounseled statements against his will to the
Commonwealth's mental health professional is in violation of the
United States Constitution as applied to her/him and consequently s/
he declines compliance with those provisions.

1

The court shall then appoint one or more qualified mental health
experts, statutorily defined, and evaluations performed pursuant to
V.C.A. §19.2-169.5 (Supp. 1989) which governs anevaluation of sanity
at the time of the offense.
'Notice shall be given to the Commonwealth at least twenty-one
days before trial. V.C.A. §19.2-264.3:1(E).
3
'This broadly includes copies of psychological, psychiatric, medical or other records obtained during the course of such evaluation.
V.C.A. §19.2-264.3:1 (D)(see V.C.A. § 19.2-169.5 forsimilar disclosure
of results obtained during an evaluation for sanity at the time of the
offense).
4
V.C.A. §19.2-264.3:1(E).
5
V.C.A. §19.2-264.3:1(G).
6
For a discussion of the defendant's right to have counsel
present during examination, see Powell v. Texas, this issue.
7
InEstelle, the Court held that a capital defendant's Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination precludes the State
from subjecting him to a psychiatric examination concerning future

See summary of Powell v. Texas, supra at p9 which held that

notice must be given to defendant or his attorney that the examinations
would encompass the issue of future dangerousness.
16483 U.S. 44, 107 S.Ct. 2704, 97 L. Ed. 2d 37 (1987).
17483 U.S. at 55, 56 (emphasis added).
S1ld. at 56.
19410 U.S. at 302.
20406 U.S. 605, 92 S.Ct. 1891, 32 L. Ed. 2d 358 (1972).
21406 U.S. at 606.
22
1d. at 609, quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
23390 U.S. 382.
24
d. at 389.
2
'1d. at 393,394, citing4 Wigmore, Evidence § 1066 (3rd ed. 1940);
8 id., §2276 (McNaughton rev. 1961).

